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Introduction
Where is China going? How will it influence world politics in the twenty-first century? As this special issue of the Journal of Contemporary China shows, such questions currently vex commentators not only in the West, but within the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well.
Passages from New Left political scientist Pan Wei and the liberal authors (including Nobel-laureate Liu Xiaobo) of "Charter 08" show how China's future direction is a shared concern. Charter 08 asks: "Where is China headed in the twenty-first century? Will it continue with 'modernization' under authoritarian rule, or will it embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system?" 1 In his introduction to The China Model, Pan likewise feels that China is at a "crossroads." But he suggests a different approach: "In the next 30 years; what direction will the Chinese nation take? Will it preserve China's rejuvenation? Or will it have superstitious faith in the Western 'liberal democracy' system, and go down the road of decline and enslavement?" 2 In Xi Jinping's first month as China's leader in 2012, he addressed this concern when he proposed the "China Dream" (中国梦) as his vision of the PRC's future direction. Xi's "China dream" is for the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," which, as he later explained, means "achieving a rich and powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the people's happiness." 3 This discussion of directions and dreams is actually part of a broad and ongoing debate about the "moral crisis" that China faces after three decades of economic reform and opening up. In other words, China's New Left, military intellectuals, traditionalists and liberals all worry about the "values crisis" presented by what they call China's new "money-worship" society. 4 Intellectuals from across the political spectrum thus are engaged in what Chinese call "patriotic worrying" (忧患意识); they feel that it is their job to ponder the fate of the nation, and to find the "correct formula" to solve China's problems. 5 Curiously, in this broad discussion, two quotations keep appearing, which offer quite distinct "correct formulas" for saving China. Many appeal to a quotation from Mao Zedong's "Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions" (1956) speech to frame China's direction and objectives in the twenty-first century:
"Given fifty or sixty years, we certainly ought to overtake the United States. This is an obligation. … [I]f after working at it for fifty or sixty years you are still unable to overtake the United States, what a sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a contribution to humanity." "When the Great Way prevails, the world will belong to all. They chose people of talent and ability whose words were sincere, and they cultivated harmony. Thus people did not only love their own parents, not only nurture their own children. … In this way selfish schemes did not arise. Robbers, thieves, rebels, and traitors had no place, and thus outer doors were not closed. This is called the Great Harmony." 7 References to these two rather different passages-that propose quite different "correct formulas" that lead to distinct directions, goals and ideals-have become common in works by citizen intellectuals, especially New Left intellectuals like Hu Angang, Liu Mingfu, Pan Wei, and Zhao Tingyang as well as establishment intellectuals like Zheng Bijian and Zhang Weiwei. This essay will examine how New Left and establishment intellectuals have addressed China's "moral crisis" with an appeal to tradition. As these two quotations show, "tradition" here refers not simply to China's pre-modern civilization, but also to China's modern revolutionary and reformist ideology. In contemporary China, tradition is both "socialism" and the more familiar pre-modern "Chinese civilization." This is an odd combination. According to common Chinese understandings of intellectual and social history, socialism challenged Confucianism, as modernity challenged tradition. Indeed, the standard narrative of the history of political thought in China sees these two quotes are contradictory: modern socialist equality vs. traditional Confucian hierarchy. Yet now Chinese intellectuals commonly say that in order to solve the PRC's current problems they need to appeal to three traditions: Reform, Revolution, and Chinese civilization. 8 This essay will do two things. It will conduct a textual analysis of these two quotations, first to locate them in their original context, and then to examine how they have been rejuvenated as guides for the twenty-first century. Then it will examine how they complement each other as part of a what could be called a "nostalgic futurology" that looks back to key events like the Great Leap Forward in order to look ahead to Chinese success in the twenty-first century. These two "correct formulas" are not the only contradictory formulations in contemporary China. It is popular to argue that the PRC is both developed and developing, rich and poor, and large and small. 9 Rather than understand Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" slogan as a contradiction that masks a growing nationalism, this essay will examine how these two passages likewise are linked in a creative tension where each defines the other. Here the conceptual strategy shifts from dialectical materialism's understanding of a contradiction as a problem that needs to be resolved, to a new strategy that allows Mao's "Strengthen Party Unity" quote and the Great Harmony passage to work together in a composite ideology that integrates equality and hierarchy into a new form of statism that is involved in a global competition of social models: the China dream versus the American dream. Hence what these two passages have in common is not necessarily a positive ideal, but a common enemy: liberalism, the West and the United States.
Quantity: Mao's Great Leap Forward to Surpass the United States
Both passages are part of the PRC's current discourse about the rise/rejuvenation of China. To understand the differences between the two passages, it is helpful to understand them in terms of quantitative and qualitative strategies. Mao's quote from "Strengthen Party Unity" about surpassing the United States is very clearly a quantitative strategy. Earlier in the speech, Mao stated that "A country like ours may and ought to be described as 'great'. Our Party is a great Party, our people a great people, our revolution a great revolution, and our construction is great, too." "Greatness" (伟大) here is not measured in terms of cultural achievement, economic equality or social justice, but in terms of tonnage of steel. "Great" thus is the material quantitative measure of "big." Big-ness is not absolute, but relative, and for Mao, relative to the United States:
The United States has a population of only 170 million, and as we have a population several times larger, are similarly rich in resources and are favored with more or less the same kind of climate, it is possible for us to catch up with the United States. What are your 600 million people doing? Dozing? Which is right, dozing or working? If working is the answer, why can't you with your 600 million people produce 200 or 300 million tons of steel when they with their population of 170 million can produce 100 million tons?
Beating the United States is not simply a national goal for China, but is seen as the PRC's responsibility to the world. Otherwise, Mao argues that China "should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a contribution to mankind." This is the first time that Mao spoke of his goal of surpassing the United States. "Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward Party Traditions" was delivered at a preparatory meeting for the CCP's Eighth Party Congress that was held in September 1956. At this time, Mao was fighting against Zhou Enlai and others who wanted to consolidate the economic and social gains of land reform and the nationalization of industry. They criticized Mao's more radical economic ideas as a "rash advance" (冒进) that was "proceeding too rapidly without due consideration of actual circumstances and likely consequences." 10 Mao's 1956 speech thus was an early expression of his push for what would later be called the "Great Leap Forward" (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) . Drawing on Khrushchev's 1957 prediction that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in fifteen years, "surpass Britain and catch up to America" (超英赶美) became Mao's main slogan for the Great Leap Forward. According to Bo Yibo, "The stated goal of the Great Leap Forward movement was to overtake Britain in iron and steel production within just two years, overtake the Soviet Union within four years, and overtake the United States within ten years."
11 As we can see, Mao became more ambitious as the movement developed.
12 But as is well-known, this ambition eventually led to humanity's greatest famine, killing more than 30 million people. 14 Military intellectual Col. Liu Mingfu and developmental economist Hu Angang come from very different institutional backgrounds and pursue quite divergent approaches to China's future; but they both appeal to Mao's "Strengthen Party Unity" quote to make similar arguments about China's unstoppable rise. For Col. Liu, China was in an era of strategic opportunity, when it was incumbent to seize the day and become the world's "No. 1 superpower." To describe why Mao is the top ideologist of "World No. 1-ism," Liu conducts a close textual analysis of the quote from Mao's 1956 "Strengthen Party Unity" speech. Mao is heroic for Liu because he dared to craft a grand plan to surpass America, stating that beating the United States would be China's great contribution to humanity. Liu is fascinated by the Great Leap Forward, seeing the outrageous ambition of this Maoist mass movement as the key to China's success in the twenty-first century. 15 Liu admits that the Great Leap Forward "suffered defeat," and that "a large population met an irregular death." But he concludes that "the 'Great Leap Forward' is the roadmap for surpassing Britain and catching up to the United States" in the twenty-first century because it shows that in order to create a new path one has destroy old rules. 16 Liu thus understands Deng Xiaoping's post-Maoist reform and opening policy as a continuation of Mao's Great Leap Forward plan. China's current and future success, here, is the upshot of Mao's ambitious aspirations from the Great Leap Forward-era. Col. Liu Mingfu's ideas and arguments are important because his China dream of the PRC as a strong military power has been largely adapted by Xi Jinping. 17 Indeed, the link between the China dream and the PRC's "strong military dream" was celebrated in a set of postage stamps that were issued in September 2013 (see Figure 1 ). Hu Angang also quotes the "Strengthen Party Unity" speech at length to argue that Mao and the speech are important because they created "the strategic concept of catching up to, and then surpassing the United States." 18 He elaborates on the Mao's materialist quantitative way of measuring power and status, quoting Mao to explain that because of its large territory, large population and superior socialist system, China is the only country in the world that is capable of catching up to and 15 Liu, Zhongguo meng, p. 9-13. 16 23 He challenges the popular notion of the Cultural Revolution as "ten lost years," explaining that this "ten-year upheaval . . . made reform and opening possible. It provided the circumstances necessary for the last thirty years of progress towards increased unity, stability and prosperity." It certainly is odd to imagine China's future in terms of the audacious aspirations and disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But this is not simply a historical lesson. Mao's "great leap strategy" is back in vogue. China's recent "great leap forward mentality" can be seen in the leadership's demands for rapid and glorious achievements such as the PRC's high-speed train network. This rush to greatness, critics argue, has led to a rash of accidents, including a major train accident in 2011, as well as to broader social and environmental problems. 25 Hu Angang, however, is unconvinced, reasoning that Mao's 1956 "Strengthen Party Unity" quotation actually is the origin of the economic reform plans unveiled by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. 26 28 China Shock is important because it sold over 1 million copies in China, was assigned reading at communist party study sessions in Shanghai, and was read by Xi Jinping in Summer 2012, just before he became China's leader.
29
While Liu Mingfu focuses on military power, and Hu Angang focuses on economic power, Zhang Weiwei focuses on political power. His main goal is to show that China's political system is better than the (Western) democratic system. To do this, he cites many Western sources to "prove" that China will soon surpass the United States economically, politically and culturally-and even argues that his native Shanghai is already better than New York. The last example comes from a recent essay by Zheng Bijian, who was Hu Jintao's top foreign policy intellectual. He is most well-known for creating the "peaceful rise" strategy that guided Beijing's very successful good neighbor policy in the mid-2000s. His elaboration on Deng's "bide and hide policy," however, was criticized by Liu 27 Since he is not popular with the New Left, it is noteworthy that Zheng begins his "The Three Globalizations and China's Fate" essay (2013) with a reference to Mao's famous quote:
"As early as in 1956, Chairman Mao Zedong said that if we failed to turn China into a great socialist country, then we would not be qualified to be citizens on this planet. Today, maybe it is fair to say that if we fail to achieve industrialization and modernization and if we can't realize the great renaissance of the Chinese civilization in the first half of the 21st century, sooner or later we would be disqualified as citizens of this world. Therefore the China dream today finds its logical beginning and historical root in their firm belief in the "survival and rejuvenation of the nation" born of the two centuries of internal crises and foreign aggression." This diverse group of citizen intellectuals exhibits the "catch-up mentality" typical of Mao in the 1950s. They measure China's success in terms of the accepted international standards of modernity: steel production, GDP, Transparency International, foreign futurologists, and so on. The catch-up mentality is permeated by status anxiety, sees international politics as a competition between great powers, and crafts familiar strategies of international development (for the economists) and "peace through strength" (for the strategists) to build the PRC's international stature. They are drawn to Mao's 1956 "Strengthen Party Unity" speech because it frames China's objectives in these materialist quantitative terms: surpass the United States in terms of military and economic measures. Certainly it's not strange for China's citizen intellectuals to think about how the PRC could be a great power, while looking to previous predictions of when China would be the world's No. 1 power. It is odd, though, that they all choose a reference to the Great Leap Forward, which was on such a different path from the Reform and Opening policy that facilitated China's rejoining the world starting in 1978. In other words, Mao's quote does not make sense for the twenty-first century because it embodies two serious misreadings: 1) rather than being an example of causation (i.e. Mao's Great Leap Forward idea led to China's current economic success), it is actually an example of correlation (Mao's prediction of success in 50-60 years came true in spite of his tragic policies that retarded China's economic growth); and 2) Mao's notion of national power measured in terms of steel production does not make sense in the context of the current global political-economy that is characterized by transnational production chains in a knowledge-based innovation economy. Indeed, China's massive production of steel is now not seen as a strength, but is taken as a sign of the weakness of an overcapacity that has to be subsidized by the state. The attraction of Mao's 1956 quote thus is not economic, but political. Liu Mingfu and Hu Angang both stress the ideological and conceptual value of "Strengthen Party Unity." For the New Left, this is part of a campaign to rehabilitate Mao, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in order to confirm the continued relevance of socialism and the CCP in China. 34 In many ways, it is an example of nostalgia for the imagined equality and order of the Maoist period, which is figured as the antidote for China's current money-worship society. 35 Mao's "Strengthen Party Unity" speech continues to strike a chord because it was memorized by a whole generation of Chinese who grew up in the Cultural Revolution; its currency also benefited from the rise of Maoist websites like Utopia in the mid-to late-2000s, which further publicized such radical thought. 36 Hu Angang's fascination with steel production is also nostalgic in a more personal way; his given name, "Angang" (鞍钢 ), is short for the Anshan Iron and Steel Factory, where Hu's parents were "national model workers." Although establishment intellectuals like Zheng advise us to get rid of our "Cold War mentality," Mao's "Strengthen Party Unity" quotation clearly limits our imagination to a Cold War-style bipolar contest between China and the United States.
Qualitative: Great Harmony and a New Kind of Superpower
International relations theorist G. John Ikenberry recently declared that China simply "does not have the ideas, capacities, or incentives to tear down the existing international order and build a new one." 37 But as the above analysis suggests, China's quantitative dream to surpass the United States has its qualitative aspects. Mao Zedong sees surpassing the world's "most advanced capitalist country" as the moral obligation of China as a "superior socialist country." This task is framed as an all or nothing quest: either China beats America to become the number one country in the world, or it gets "read off the face of the earth." In the twenty-first century, Col. Liu Mingfu shares Mao's zero-sum "worrying mentality" to argue that if Beijing misses its current great opportunity for grand success then it risks total failure: "If China in the twenty-first century cannot become world No. 1, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside." 38 As we saw above, Zheng Bijian came to a similar conclusion for China's current dream: "if we can't realize the great renaissance of the Chinese civilization in the first half of the 21st century, sooner or later we would be disqualified as citizens of this world." Everyone here assumes that China's quantitatively surpassing the United States will directly lead to qualitative change: China will provide a new, different, unique and superior normative world order. Hu Angang's quantitative appeal to Mao's "Strengthen Party Unity" speech is part of a larger qualitative argument about how China can be a different type of superpower: "a mature, responsible, and attractive superpower" that would never "seek hegemony and world domination." 39 Actually the link between quantitative and qualitative strategies is not as clear as China's citizen intellectuals assume. In fact, China surpassed the United States in steel production in 1995 and became the world leader in 1996-but the world order did not change. 40 Since 2007, the European Union's GDP has been larger than America's GDP; while there was hope that this would lead to a new postmodern normative world order, the EU has yet to emerge as a different kind of world leader. 41 The previous political-economic transition was also multilayered: the United States became the world's largest economy when it passed Britain in 1872-but it did not become a global power until seventy years later with the advent of World War II. Nevertheless, many citizen intellectuals feel that the PRC will have to assume global political leadership soon after it becomes the largest economy in the world. They see global leadership as a "crown" that is passed from one world capital to another: from London to Washington in the 1940s, and now from Washington to Beijing in the 2010s. While the quantitative arguments generally appeal to shared international standards of measurement-steel production, GDP growth, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Human Development Index-it is also common for citizen intellectuals to argue that China needs to create its own norms and standards. Firstly, they note that Western predictions of China's growth have characteristically been wrong; 42 (unfortunately, they don't likewise acknowledge that Chinese economic predictions haven't fared much better). Even so, the conclusion of these patriotic worriers is that China needs to discover its own "correct formula": its own system of measures, methods and norms that will better reflect its own experience, because the unique China Model can only be evaluated by uniquely Chinese criteria.
43 This is part of the critique of "universal values" found in most New Left literature. According to philosopher Zhao Tingyang, to be a true world power the PRC needs to excel not just in economic production, but also in "knowledge production." It needs to stop importing ideas from the West, and exploit China's own indigenous "resources of traditional thought" to "create new world concepts and new world structures." 44 Only then can China gain the "discursive power" of the "China voice" and "China perspective" that are necessary for a new type of superpower. 45 Since the early 2000s, "harmony" has been promoted as China's alternative to the ideas of freedom and democracy. Hu Jintao's twin slogans were Harmonious Society for domestic politics and Harmonious World for international politics. For many then, harmony is taken as the quintessentially Chinese ideal. However, on closer examination, what we now call "harmony" in Chinese and English can have two quite different meanings: he er butong (和而不同) means harmony-with-diversity, while Datong (大同) is Great Harmony. Great Harmony describes an overarching unity: the "tong" in Datong also means sameness. This sameness is seen as harmonious because it describes a united universal utopia. As we saw in the introduction, the main source of the ideal of Great Harmony is a famous passage from the Book of Rites; it remains one of Chinese thought's key ideals, and still informs plans to create a "perfect world." 46 While Great Harmony creates perfection through a unified organic order, "harmonywith-diversity" questions the utility of sameness, and finds value in contingent relations. In the famous passage which gives us the phrase "harmony-with-diversity," the Confucian Analects discusses the harmony/sameness (和/同) distinction that is found throughout classical Chinese literature: "The exemplary person harmonizes with others, but does not necessarily agree with them (i.e. harmony-with-diversity); the small person agrees with others, but is not harmonious with them." 47 Here The Analects tells us that agreeing with people means that you are the same as them, in the sense of being uncritically the same: sameness-without-harmony. Harmony-withdiversity, on the other hand, allows us to encourage different opinions, norms and models in a civil society. Rather than describing the same value that is instinctively known by all Chinese, Great Harmony and harmony-with-difference present very different models of social order and world order: one appeals to the benefits of overarching unity, while the other seeks to encourage opportunities for diversity. This is not simply a philosophy lesson: these two concepts of harmony continue to be invoked by political leaders and citizen intellectuals in China as a way of describing Chinese visions of future social order and world order. This is not a totally new trend: Kang Youwei's the Book of Great Harmony (大同书) from the turn of the 43 51 In June 1958, Liu Shaoqi explained how the Great Leap Forward was using Marxism to fulfill the Great Harmony objective: "Kang Youwei wanted to break the nine boundaries, that is, the boundaries of the nation-state, male versus female, the family, private property, and so on. Conditions weren't ripe for implementation of utopian socialist ideas at that time. Now Marxists have seized hold of class struggle and have already abolished class or are in the process of doing so, and are thereby implementing the utopia that utopian socialists were unable to implement." 52 The Great Leap Forward's violent pursuit of equality and unity was actually in line with Kang Youwei's One World plan. As Kang wrote with excitement and anticipation, "by the time we have our World of Great Harmony, the people of all the earth will be of the same color, the same appearance, the same size, and the same intelligence." However, achieving this goal of unity and equality would be disastrous for difference: to achieve racial equality, for example, Kang provides a detailed plan of how the white and yellow races can "annihilate" the black and brown races through a social Darwinist process of "smelting and amalgamating." Large states will likewise "annihilate" small and weak states in the pursuit of global unity. 53 Much like in the Great Leap Forward, Kang's World of Great Harmony pursues "samenesswithout-harmony" at the expense of "harmony-with-diversity." After the Great Leap Forward, Chinese civilization became a key target during the Cultural Revolution that sought to destroy the Four Olds, and then again during the early Reform period where it was seen as "feudal superstition" that needed to be modernized in Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernizations campaign. Chinese culture became important again with Jiang Zemin's focus on patriotic education and spiritual civilization in the 1990s. Chinese tradition was seen as useful in the CCP's transition from being a revolutionary party that demanded radical change, to being a ruling party that advocates stability maintenance; Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" specifically argued that the CCP had to represent "China's advanced culture," and not just socialist culture. 54 Discussion of Great Harmony thus reemerged at the turn of the twenty-first century, but in a curious place: the alternative academic space of communist party schools, policy institutes and military research institutes that run parallel to elite universities. 55 Rather than arguing that Confucianism had replaced communism, these articles generally looked at how Great Harmony could-or could not-work with Marxism in China. Those who argued that Great Harmony could help Marxism looked to the links between Confucian thought and radicals such as Taiping Rebellion leader Hong Xiuquan, Kang Youwei, Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong. This made Great Harmony patriotic, while at the same time confirming the nationalist authenticity and legitimacy of the CCP. Those who questioned the utility of Great Harmony contrasted the timeless ideal of its utopian socialism with scientific socialism's logic of class struggle. According to historical materialism, China was in the period of industrialization, therefore Great Harmony was criticized as a utopian socialism that grew out of the agricultural society of sage kings and Confucius. Critics also noted that the Great Harmonyinspired Taiping Rebellion and Great Leap Forward both led to catastrophes for China: it pushed Mao to skip historical stages to prematurely rush into communism. 56 The declaration of Hu Jintao's Harmonious Society and Harmonious World slogans in 2004-05 signaled victory for those who valued Great Harmony. Harmonious society promoted a very detailed set of policies that looked to the party-state to solve China's economic and social problems. Therefore, Harmonious Society's statecentric intervention into society appeals to a particular blend of socialist modernity and Chinese tradition. While English-language descriptions of the policy stress its Confucian roots, in Chinese it is called "harmonious socialist society." This also has global implications: Chinese writers commonly proclaim "harmonious society is the model for the world." 57 America and the Arab League in 2009, harmony-with-diversity has decreased in popularity since the mid-2000s; on the other hand, declarations of Great Harmony as China's long-term goal have become very popular in recent years. Great Harmony thus informs a Chinese futurology that looks to the past for ideals to shape a utopian future. Curiously, the endgame for most of China's chief economic, social and political forecasters is the World of Great Harmony (大同世界, 世界大同, 天下大同). Unfortunately, such descriptions of Great Harmony are characteristically vague. When Justin Yifu Lin was World Bank Chief Economist (2008-2012), he had a calligraphic scroll of the Great Harmony passage on his wall in Washington D.C. Lin explained that its ideals guided his plans for the global economy because "it advocates a world in which everyone trusts each other, cares for others and not only for himself. . . . This was my vision for the World Bank. . . . We try to work on poverty reduction and promote sustainable growth." 59 In The China Model, Pan Wei argues that the patriarchal values of village life, which is presented as a conflict-free organic society, is the source of the PRC's economic success. He sees the PRC as village society writ-large, where the party loves the people like a caring father, and the masses are loyal, grateful and respectful, like well-behaved children. There is no room in this national village for open debate in "civil society," which Pan condemns as a battleground of special interests that can only divide the organic whole. For him, diversity is "division," and thus a problem that needs to be solved by the state. Unity here is the guiding value because Pan-like Kang Youwei-sees social order as a process of integrating divisions into the organic whole, ultimately into the World of Great Harmony. 60 Like with the China Model, China Dream discourse focuses primarily on domestic issues. But there is a growing discussion of its global implications. For example, Chapter 7 of Xi Jinping's official "China Dream" book is devoted to explaining the meaning of this slogan to the world. The PRC's chief foreign propaganda organization, the State Council Information Office, held a "China Dream: Dialogue with the World" international conference in December 2013. 61 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi likewise described the "China Dream" as Xi Jinping's key conceptual innovation in foreign affairs, which led to a successful year for Chinese diplomacy in 2013. 62 Many commentators discuss China's global rejuvenation in terms of the "World Dream" (世界梦). As Ma Zhengang, former ambassador to the United Kingdom, declared, "China's Dream is the world's dream." 63 Xi Jinping explained that the China
